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Introduction
Perceptions about the benefits of environmental protection
have changed dramatically over the past decade. While there is
generally widespread support for environmental goals, there is
concern for the high cost often associated with environmental
programs. Recognition is growing of the critical role of the
institutions in dealing more effectively with projects involving costs
that are spread across a large number of people and benefits which are
highly concentrated.! Markets promise great potential in promoting
liberty, economic freedom, and prosperity. Ronald H. Coase, recipient
of the 1991 Nobel prize in Economics, published a seminal article in
1960 demonstrating that, given two caveats, private markets allocate
resources efficiently.2 The two caveats of the Coase theorem are: (1)
transactions costs are not prohibitive, and (2) property rights are
assigned to all scarce resources.
In this paper, we apply the Coase theorem to two very
different environmental resource issues: private property as an
elephant management technique and tradable discharge permits as an
air quality management approach. Elephants and air quality are
obviously quite different resources. Yet the key to their protection
rests upon the development of property rights and markets that
efficiently allocate these scarce resources. We conclude with

1 Meiners, R. E., and Yandle, B., (1993) Takine- the Environment Seriously. Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
2 Coase, R.H., "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44
Oct. 1960.
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recommendations for market based approaches in order to more
efficiently manage the scarce resources of elephants and air quality.

1.

Liberty and Markets: The Coase Theorem

Economics revolves around exchange and, in order for
exchange to occur, property rights must be defined for scarce
resources in the economy. Private markets provide the forum through
which mutually beneficial exchanges take place and, because trades
are entirely voluntary, at least one party gains, and none loses. In
other words, private market exchanges tend to be Pareto-superior
moves for society. The Coase theorem demonstrates that, as long as
property rights are assigned and transactions costs are not prohibitive,
interventionist government policies cannot allocate resource more
efficiently than private markets.
A critical caveat is that the ability of private markets to engage in
Pareto-superior trades depends upon the rights of owners to use and
exchange resources. Without private ownership, markets cannot
allocate resources to their most productive uses. Air, for example, that
is not owned by anyone will tend to be overused and elephants that
. are not property to someone will be poorly protected. As common
property, both environmental resources will be depleted as dischargers
overload the air with residuals and poachers obtain valuable ivory by
killing elephants. When scarce resources are not owned by private
individuals, both quality and quantity decline over time because there
is no incentive to care for "common property resources." Called
"tragedy of the commons," this abuse of common property resources
occurs in an economy of markets. In the absence of private property
institutions, highest · bidders are not the only users of resources.
Because they are not charged for its use, many individuals will
compete for, and thus overuse, a "free" resource.
It is also important to recognize that ownership of particularly
scarce resources is transient because bidders will purchase the right to
use resources as long as private markets allow exchange and people
perceive differential values. The other caveat, transactions costs, argues
that, the smaller transactions costs, the greater the potential gain from
trade.
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2.

Elephants as Scarce Resources
The plight of elephants is serious in East and Central Mrica
where elephants are not private property. From 1979 to 1989, the
population of Central Mrican elephants declined from 497,400 to
274,800 while the population of East African elephants fell from
546,650 to 154,720. Other sources report that poachers halved the
elephant population from 1.2 million in 1981 to 623,000 some eight
years later.3 In game parks the elephant population is estimated to
have declined by 56% while outside parks the decline was 78%. The
worst case projection was that elephants could be extinct in East and
Central Africa as early as 1995.4 In contrast, the elephant populations
in the southern Mrican countries of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi,
Namibia, and South Mrica are increasing at a rate of 5% annually.s
Zimbabwe is thought to have ten times as many elephants now as in
1900.6

The explanation for the difference in elephant prospects rests
upon property rights. Elephants in Southern Mrica are considered a
valuable resource for tourism as well as ivory. In Zimbabwe, shops
openly sell ivory and hides from elephants culled to prevent
overpopulation in the country's game parks. The regulated sale of
elephant products and the protection of elephants is viewed as
consistent with the goal of increasing the population of the elephants.
This now. widely recognized fact has failed to affect
international policy for the management of elephants as endangered
species. A· review of recent books on the plight of the elephants
documents this change of attitude:

3 Op. cit, 344.
4 UNEP/GEMS Environment Library No. 3, The African Elephant, p. 32. See, also
Barbier, E. B., Burgess, J.C., Swanson, T. M., and Pearce, D. W., Ele.phapts.
Economics and Iyozy, Eartbscan Publications, London, 1990.

5 Simmons, R. and Krueter, U., "Herd Mentality: Banning Ivory Sales Is No Way to
Save the Elephant", Policy Review, Fall1989, p. 46.
6 The African

EJ~pbapt

UNEP/GEMS Environment Library No. 3, page 12.
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... to the park managers, the slaughter of "surplus" elephants
(called "culling") is believed to be a logical form of game
management, and when a cull occurs both the resident and the
immigrant elephants are · shot by the hundreds if not
thousands. This happens at a time when elephants are said to
be endangered. Why are they shot" Their wildlife managers
make three assumptions: first, that animal populations require
human control (so the "right" biomass is usually detennined
by the highest-ranking game warden on the scene and
therefore varies over time as well as by area); second, that the
planet is our farm, and if wild animals are to be tolerated they
must give us a commodity -- as pigs must yield ham, so
elephants must yield ivory ... ; third, that elephants in large
numbers eat too many trees, while park managers would
prefer that they ate grasses and bushes. 7
~
Communities that pay the price of living with wildlife [should]
also reap its financial rewards ... Unless you give wildlife
economic value, convincing locals [that providing for] it is the
best use of their land, wild animals will not survive." Put
simply, the villagers have found how to earn money, not from
hides and tusks, but from outlanders hungry for the sight of
real wild animals." (Morals, p. 338)
"European and American hunters have been forking over as
much as $40,000 for the privilege of shooting, say, an
elephant or some other species, such ·as wildebeest, an impala
or a warthog. "(Morals, p. 338)
. Many years ago, Zimbabwe's government found that the most
effective way to protect elephants is through property rights, regulated
hunting using permits, and the sale of elephant products. Property
rights to elephants are held by some two dozen peasant villages which
earn $5 million per year from the sale of elephant hunting rights on
their communal lands to safari operations. Because elephants provide

7 Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall, "Of Ivory and the Survival of Elephants," New York
Book Reyjew, 24 March 1994, p.3.
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revenue, the natives have the incentive to prevent overpopulation and
poaching. Zimbabwe's elephant population has increased to 77,000
from the 32,000 in 1960.8
In Zimbabwe and other parts of southern Mrica the ownership
of wildlife was turned over to local villages. Suddenly, what had been
a liability [destructive free roaming elephants] became a valuable
asset. For example, the flrst year (1991) the region of Tyunga put its
region's hunting rights up for bid, the franchise to safari operators
generated$ 63,600 in extra revenue. By 1992, the revenue reached $
350,000.
.
The southern Mrican approach, known as "conservation
through utilization," "sustainable yield," "rational utilization," and
"conservation through commercialization" is based on property rights
in elephants. It is the old story: people take better care of their own
property than they do of property that does not belong to them. This
approach allows safari hunting and tourism on private, state, and
communal lands as well as the sale of ivory and hides. It is based on
the logic recognized by numerous commentators, but few professional
preservationists, that "the communities that pay the price of living with
wildlife [should] also reap its fmancial rewards. "9 Zimbabwe has an
effective anti-poaching program with expenditures of over $600 per
square ·mile to protect wildlife. It also has a minimum prison term of
five years for those convicted of the illegal killing of elephants. The
penalty is often more severe: Zimbabwean game scouts have killed a
number of raiding Zambian poachers. The applicability of the
concept of property rights to air quality is discussed in the following
section.

3.

Air as a Scarce Resource

In the same way that elephants are endangered from abuse to
the commons in East and Central Africa and plentiful in Southern
Africa, the common air mass used for disposal of gaseous residuals is
limited and hence a scarce resource. Managed as private property, the
price would rise as it becomes more scarce. Like the management of
elephants as a common property resource, the protection of the
8 Morals, R. C., "Save the Elephants," Forbes, September 14, 1992, p. 344.
9 Morals, p. 338.
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"commonly" held air mass from damaging residuals is undertaken by
"command and control" regulations for specific pieces of equipment.
U.S. finns spend large amounts of money on pollution
control abatement and equipment.lO In 1988, these expenditures were
estimated to be $86 billion and are now over $120 billion.u Some
firms even stand to gain handsomely from Clean Air Act
restrictions.12 Regulation reduces the incentives for entrepreneurs to
f"md better ways to manage residuals because regulations require a
specific type of pollution-abatement equipment even though there
may exist other types of equipment or inputs that are cheaper or more
effective. Once a particular type of equipment is written into the Code
of Federal Regulations finns have little incentive to search for better
ways to comply with meet EPA. As a consequence, such regulation
may be a significant deterrent to economic growth.
Studies conducted by the Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress show that the transactions costs of S02
management using emissions trading would be substantially lower
when compared to the current system based on command and
control.l3 The 1990 Clean Air Act, for example, has been estimated to

10 For a discussion of the efficiency arguments for property rights in air quality
management, see e.g., Lee, R. D. and Misiolek, W. S., "Substituting Pollution
Taxation for General Taxation: Some Implications for Efficiency in Pollution
Taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Mana2emeut. 13, 338 - 347
(1986).

11 Table 386, "Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures" p.213; Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1991.
12 Gutfeld. R., "Pure Plays: For Each Dollar Spent on Clean Air Someone Stands to
make a Buck," The Wall Street JournaL 29 October 1990. A-1.
13 Figures I and 2, Parker, L. B., "Implementing S02 Allowance Trading:
Implications of Transaction Costs and Taxes," Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress, U. S. Congress, 12 March, 1993, p.2, 2.
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create an additional burden on businesses of $25 billion a year.I4
Estimates of the annualized costs for 1993 - 2010 range from $922
billion to $1,537 billion.
Marketable pollution permits encourage innovation by allowing
firms to decide how they want to meet their required emission
reduction. As a result the integrity of the law is maintained while the
least cost solution is obtained for the region because fmns with high
control costs will purchase "reductions" from frrms with lower control
costs. Although the current EPA emission trading program is not the
"ideal" system envisioned by economists, it is consistent with the Coase
theorem. Firms have a limited property right to sell their excess
emission reductions defmed as reductions achieved beyond regulatory
requirements.
The 1990 Clean Air Act established a market-based program
managing so2 emissions from major coal-frred power plants in order
to meet a annual reduction of 10 million tons from 19 million tons to
9 million tons by 2000. This approach allows each power station to
determine the most cost-effective means of achieving the emission
limitation, e.g, installing equipment, changing inputs, or purchasing
·emission reductions from other sources. IS
An advantage to this policy is that it creates an incentive for firms
to profit from the sale of their permits when they reduce emissions
below regulatory requirements. By not specifying how pollution
control is to be achieved and by allowing fmns to decide how much
pollution they find profitable to reduce, this plan encourages fmns to
manage residuals at least cost to them and to the region. Market-based
14 Bob Davis, "Bush Plans to Unveil a 90-Day Moratorium on New
Wall Street Journal Jan. 20, 1992. AI.

Regulations,"~

15 The Environmental Protection Agency will issue enough permits that, by the year
2000, all power stations will have received their allotment of pollution permits that
may either be used or sold to other power plants. Each permit allows the discharge of
one ton annually and the number of permits received is based on bow much they
currently pollute. Some flllllS will find it advantageous to reduce their emissions and
sell some of their permits, others may find it cheaper to purchase other's permits
rather than purchase new equipment. Because there are large differences in technology,
plant age and fuel use among power plants, there will be both buyers and sellers of
pollution permits.
·
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approaches for air quality management increase liberty, economic
freedom, and prosperity. Similar benefits have been shown for
managing elephants as private property.

4.

Why Not Markets?
Despite the success in Southern Africa in elephant
management and the potential for reducing the cost of air quality
management, property rights approaches remain on the fringes of
acceptability. Such approaches have failed to command the moral
high ground in the policy debate involving environmental quality
issues because many people do not believe that people should profit
from doing the right thing. But prohibiting trade in ivory yields only
high rhetoric; it does not increase the number of elephants.
The debate over market based policies may be characterized as a
split between two extremes: 1) professional preservationists who
oppose the use of resources such as elephants and clean air and 2) the
, who favor allocation of resources on the basis of their marketdetermined values, advocate hunting and trade in elephant ivory and
support tradable pollution permits. The preservationists' symbols of
the decaying elephant carcass or the smoke stack evoke the argument
that all hunters are poachers and industrial firms are greedy polluters.
They criticize commercial conservationists on moral terms; hunting
and industrial production are a threat to the moral order and are
carried out by "bad people" -- for example, profiteers, hunters,
poachers and despoilers. As a symbol of their outrage, professional
preservationists make a public spectacle over the destroying of
contraband. Over the past 5 years, Taiwan has destroyed thousands of
kilograms of contraband ivory, ivory products, bear paws, leopard
skins, rhinoceros and antelope horns, and lion skins. The destruction
of ivory was symbolic of Taiwan's dedication to saving the African
elephant by ending trade in ivory.J6

16 "Ivory, Hom, Animal Skins Burned: ROC Praised for Wildlife Conservation," ~
Eree China Journal, 4 February 1991, Vol. VIII, No. 10. Note also that in July of
1989, Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi set fire to 12-tons of elephant tusks
confiscated from poachers. Valued at nearly $3 million, the contraband was symbolic
of the argument that poachers are the cause of the dramatic reduction in the Kenyan
elephants. Notice, however, that a common interest will often exist for seemingly
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In 1993 the Chicago Mercantile Exchange set the stage for
emission rights as a commodity.l7 Yet little has happened because of
the micro-management of EPA over the process of quantifying,
certifying, and banking the emission reduction credits. While this
holds promise, the reality is one of limited success. The revised but
limited EPA trading rules pursuant to the 1990 Amendments to the
Clean Air Act continue to constrain interflnn trades. These restrictions
cause flnns to extend the lives of old, more heavily polluting capital
stock and delay the introduction of new, more cleanly operating
plants.IB While this "retirement delay" effect retards innovation
directly by keeping existing equipment in operation, EPA regulations
· also discourage innovation by preventing finns from introducing
lower cost, innovative pollution control equipment or processes.
One outcome of prohibitions on hunting and trade in elephant
products is high-priced ivory (favored by the poachers) and well
financed preservationists (as the protector of the endangered
. species).I9 However, the fate of the elephants is the continued decline
dissimilar political interest groups when special interest benefits may be generated.
17 "Efficient-Markets Pollution," The Wall Street Joumal. 2 March 1992. A-12.

18 See Brady, G. L. and Maloney, M. T., "Capital Turnover and Marketable Pollution
Rights," Journal of Law and Economics. 31 (Aprill988): 203-26.
19 A segmented market [illegal and legal] has occWTed in a number of goods, most
notably alcohol, giving rise to a phenomenon dubbed the "bootleggers and the
Baptists." Bootleggers and Baptists have historically supported a form of social
regulation that closes comer liquor stores on Sunday. The bootleggers want to
eliminate direct competition; the Baptists also want to reduce indirect competition
and diminish the consumption of alcoholic beverages. This case involving alcohol
illustrates how the regulation of legal sales produces a price differential between legal
and illegal prices. The stricter the regulation, the greater the differential between the
two sets of prices. One might speculate that the interested parties advocating the ban
on hunting and trade could be the contraband dealers (gaining through increased value
of ivory) and the preservationists (gaining through increased contributions). A
coalition of environmental and high sulfur coal producers was documented in the
decision requiring full scrubbing of all coal regardless of sulfur content. See Yandle
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in the elephant population in countries which do not use property
rights as a management strategy. In their pursuit of an "official
ideology," the preservationists see that it is the duty of "good people"
to bring them to justice. Marketed as agents of social redemption,
preservationists are apocalyptic about what will happen if they are not
heeded and naive about what will happen if they are successful.
Preservationists identify the "natural moral order" with an ideal
condition of primitive, pre-industrial [i.e., non-polluting] human
activities. Viewing the environment as a zero sum game and seeing no
tradeoffs, die-hard preservationists reject the legitimacy of a political
bargaining process that allows the environmental quality to appear
tradeable.
Unfortunately, the facts about increasing elephant populations are
not widely known. The declining population in Kenya continues to
receive the bulk of media attention. Establishing an "official ideology"
is difficult when science does· not support the proposed view.
Proponents of making a non-scientific view the "official ideology"
have options. They may undertake scientific investigations to support
the non-hunting position. It is difficult to argue that the property
rights approach has not been successful in southern Mrica. A second
approach by proponents of an "official ideology" involved emotional
appeals to the public to support the non-scientific view. Professional
preservationists have done well in this regard because it is perception
not reality that drives the political process. Fears motivate voters far
more effectively than facts. Furthermore, there is the natural tendency
for sensational news to dominate the media concerned with ratings. A
third approach used by the proponents of an "official ideology" is to
discredit supporters of the opposing view, i.e., property rights.

s.

Policy Recommendations
The Coase theorem indicates a role for government in the
creation and preservation of well-defined property rights. The key is
to have rules that allow the private market to allocate scarce resources.
Governments do not have a process for taking future benefit into
account; only private owners of resources do. Government officials
with property entrusted to their care tend to act in a shortsighted

(1989) and Ackennan and Hassler (1981).
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manner because they cannot benefit directly from decisions or
sacrifices they make today. This shortsightedness explains why
misguided government policies have exacerbated environmental
problems in the developing world.
·
Property rights hold great potential for improving the environment
at least cost and encouraging innovation that provides the fuel for
prosperity, expands economic freedom, and increases personal liberty.
Although air quality has improved since the passage of the Clean Air
Act since 1970, one can argue that the improvement would have been
greater and cheaper if a property rights approach had been used.
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